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I. INTRODUCTION
Judaism has always had a death penalty. The procedures and restrictions
for capital punishment in ancient Israel were set forth in the great text of
Jewish law and thought - the Talmud.' It is commonly said that rigorous
proof and procedural requirements limited the actual number of executions.
But Judaism still permitted, even required, that certain wrongdoers die for
their crimes.
The United States today also has a death penalty. Proof and procedural
requirements also are rigorous, though not as stringent as those created by
the rabbis of the Talmud. The death penalty is controversial for us, as it was
for them.
This article attempts to deepen the death penalty debate in America by
introducing into that debate some of the themes raised by Talmudic sources.
While the authors are not specialists in the field of Talmudic penology, we
are confident that we have chosen representative perspectives from the Talmud to compare with modem views. Each of the themes we introduce here is
obviously deserving of fuller treatment than we give it. Brief treatment is
helpful, however, in seeing the death penalty itself illuminated by each light
in turn. This article presupposes familiarity by the reader of the basic debates
in modem American constitutional law and thus in a general way with the
concepts of interpretavism and non-interpretavism.
II. THE TALMUDIC AND AMERICAN DEATH PENALTIES
The death penalty in America is familiar to most readers. In 1972, the
United States Supreme Court struck down the death penalty as applied.' But
in 1976, the Court upheld the death penalty as not violative in principle of
the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. At the same time, the Court upheld the validity of particular death penalty statutes in Texas,3 Florida,4 and Georgia.'
Since 1976, the Court has outlined specific procedures that must be incorporated in any death penalty statute, including a separate sentencing proceeding
1. No introduction to the Talmud could be adequate, of course. These are the first words of the Reference Guide at the beginning of the Steinsaltz edition of the Talmud:
(T]he Talmud is the central pillar supporting the entire spiritual and intellectual edifice of
Jewish life. The Talmud, in the broader sense of the term, is made up of two components:
the Mishnah, which is the first written summary of the Oral Law, and the Gemara (called
Talmud in the more restricted sense of the term), which is formally an explanation and
commentary on the Mishnah.
THE TALMUD i (Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz ed., 1989).
2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
4. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
5. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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after the conclusion of the trial on guilt. Today thirty-seven states and the
federal government have death penalty statutes, under which more than 2,800
prisoners on death rows across the nation await execution.
The Talmudic death penalty is difficult to describe. The Talmud represents a compilation of discussions on various topics of Jewish law and learning that took place over hundreds of years in the academies of Babylonia and
Palestine. When discussing a specific topic like the death penalty, the detailed discussions in the Talmud falsely suggest that the discussions corresponded to practice. The extent of correspondence is not known. The Talmud
was not fully compiled until hundreds of years after the loss of Jewish political sovereignty in Israel. It is not clear how much of its pronouncements
were ever enforced.
The Talmud describes two different types of executions. One, the formal/legal penalty, was imposed and carried out by a court of twenty-three.
This system reflects the onerous procedural and evidentiary requirements for
which the Talmudic death penalty is known.
A very few examples will suffice to demonstrate the difficulty of convicting a defendant in a capital case.6 According to Gerald Blidstein, "It has
long been a truism that Jewish law is so weighted as to make execution a
virtual impossibility."7 In most trials, civil as well as criminal, a legal decision could not be reached on the evidence of only one witness.' But in capital cases, the two witnesses both must have seen the accused while he was
committing the offense.9 The witnesses also must have warned the accused
of the punishment for the offense before he committed it, and the accused
must have expressly acknowledged the penalty before proceeding.'" There
were in addition a number of procedural and standard-of-proof protections
for the accused." Perhaps the most dramatic was that if the twenty-threemember court voted unanimously for conviction upon hearing the evidence,
the accused was acquitted; only if some members voted to acquit was a conviction permissible.' 2
Obviously, if these rules were followed, there would be almost no convictions in capital cases. And, indeed, a court that ordered an execution once

6. These examples also apply in some cases which are not capital cases. The two witness rule applied in cases in which flogging or the death penalty was authorized and in certain civil cases. See AARON
M. SCHREIBER, JEWISH LAW AND DECISION-MAKING 277, 357 (1979). Most of the rules described infra
were also used in cases other than capital. See THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, 14 Judges 32, ch. 5, § 4 [hereinafter MISHNEH TORAH].
7. Gerald J. Blidstein, Capital Punishment-The Classic Jewish Discussion, in CONTEMPORARY JEWISH ETHICS 317 (Menachem Marc Kellner ed., 1978).
8. See MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 6, at 32, ch. 5. § 1.
9. Id. at 89.
10. Id. at 34.
11. See, e.g., MISHNEH, Sanhedrin, ch. 4, § 1.
12. MISHNEH TORAH, supra note 6, at 28.
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in seven years was condemned as "destructive."' 3 Other voices in the tradition applied that epithet if a court condemned to death one person in seventy
years.' 4
At the same time that this imposing legal structure operated, however, a
parallel system or systems of execution also existed. The Sanhedrin retained
the capacity to execute without recourse to legal formality in a time of emergency. The King maintained the same authority. In addition, if an obviously
guilty criminal escaped condemnation in the formal system through operation
of a procedural or evidentiary requirement, he was poisoned."
III. LIMITS OF COMPARISON

The differences between Israel in the period before the redaction of the
Talmud and America today are obviously great. Comparing them could not
resolve issues besetting us. The most significant difference between ancient
Israel and modem America is the level of violence. Even proponents of the
death penalty in the Talmud appeared to accept the perspective noted above
that a court that ordered an execution "once in seven years" is considered
destructive. No American jurisdiction with a death penalty today could afford
such a diffident approach. If we are to have a death penalty at all, with over
20,000 homicides a year, it must be a massively widespread penalty compared to that of Israel.
The rabbis of the Talmud could not have accepted the routinization of
the death penalty necessitated by such large numbers. Illustrative of this
reluctance is the surrender of capital case jurisdiction by the Sanhedrin over
thirty years before Rome destroyed the Second Temple. 6 The Gemara accounts for this action with the seemingly peculiar explanation that the
Sanhedrin, observing the number of murders increasing, decided that capital
trials could "not properly be dealt with judicially" any longer. 7 The rabbis
did have experience with temporary upsurges in violence and dealt with them
by reducing procedural and evidentiary requirements for the death penalty"
something like what the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have done in the
face of public anxiety in America about violent crime. But these departures
were temporary. In contrast, the American condition of violent crime is not
an emergency in the sense of being a temporary upsurge. A high level of
violent crime is a permanent American condition. The Talmudic death penal-

13. THE MISHNAH 403 (Herbert Danby trans.. 1933). The word translated here as "destructive" is
elsewhere defined as "tyrannical" (THE MISHNAH (Philip Blackman trans., 1954)) and "murderous"
(FRANCINE KLAGSBURN, VOICES OF WISDOM 361 (1980)).
14. Id.
15. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 81b.
16. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 15a.
17. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Abodah Zarah 8b.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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ty was designed for only occasional use.
Aside from the enormous size of our crime problem, the American death
penalty differs from that of the Talmud in that it is part of a secular criminal
justice system. Americans like to think of themselves as religious - as descended from the Judeo-Christian tradition. We like to think of our public
policy as embodying religious ideals. But the death penalty shows that at
least in some contexts, a culture either has a religious perspective or it does
not. An important part of the Talmudic death penalty - some say its overriding purpose - was to attain atonement for the condemned through a trial
functioning as a religious service. The Talmudic death penalty is unfathomable apart from atonement and ritual."
The American death penalty does not have and cannot have, given the
assumptions of our constitutional order, any focus on ritual and atonement. It
would probably be reversible error for a jury even to consider that by condemning a defendant to death, they might be guaranteeing to him "a portion
in the world to come.'
The secular nature of the American death penalty is not a function of
judges imposing a radical separation of Church and State on an unwilling
population - which is how some Americans look at the ban on prayer in the
public schools, for example. Americans simply do not think about ritual and
atonement in deciding the death penalty policy question. Retribution - restoring the balance in the moral order - does have a religious origin. And
clearly, retribution is one of the goals served by the American death penalty.
But retribution is now only a pale reflection of that religious origin.22 Nor
does retribution exhaust a religious viewpoint.
For these, and for other reasons, simply incorporating Talmudic practice
in the American legal system would not be coherent or possible. Nor would
it make sense to grant normative supremacy to the Talmud, per se. The two
systems are different; the two societies are different.

19.

SCHREIBER, supra note 6, at 277.

20.

See infra text accompanying notes 44-46.

21.

Cf. MISHNAH, Sanhedrin, ch. 6 § 2. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has excluded religious refer-

ences in death penalty cases twice in recent years. In Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630 (Pa.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2290 (1992), the court reversed a sentence of death because the prosecutor

urged the jury to follow God's law and return a sentence of death. Then, on authority of Chambers, an
equally divided court upheld a sentence of death in Commonwealth v. Daniels, 612 A.2d 295 (Pa. 1992),
despite a trial court ruling that "religion" not be discussed by counsel during closing argument. Apparent-

ly, it is now error in Pennsylvania for anyone in a death penalty case to mention the Bible.
A California prosecutor actually did argue to a capital jury that imposing the death penalty could
save a defendant's soul. The California Supreme Court held that such a suggestion was improper, although
harmless error in the particular case. People v. Sandoval, 52 Cal. Rptr. 1307 (Ca. 1992).
22.

Cf. Beruria's discussion with her husband, R. Meir, infra. note 44. While both secular and reli-

gious viewpoints seek to restore the moral order, in a secular world this is done by infliction of pain,
without hope or care for the criminal's redemption. In Jewish thought, the moral order is restored by repentance.
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So, why compare them? The Talmud is a legal system that aspired to
reflect God's purpose in the world. If such a system could confidently put
men and women to death, then perhaps so can we. If, on the other hand, the
rabbis of the Talmud agonized over execution, limited its reach, and sought
to excuse where possible, perhaps we need to imitate their voices.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE
Both the American legal tradition and the Talmudic tradition have had to
deal with the conflict of obedience and innovation faced by a judge. As
Robert Cover described in his book about the nineteenth century anti-slavery
judges, Justice Accused, 3 the conflict can be particularly acute when a
judge is dealing with a practice felt to be unjust, but which has perceived
legal legitimacy.
One possible response to such conflicts in America is for the judge to
declare the challenged practice unconstitutional. A major focus of American
conservative legal theory is to argue that this response is not legitimate that constitutional interpretation should not be based on morality. Instead it
should be based on history or language or some other basis that is said to be
more predictable and objective than morality. Justice Scalia recently echoed
this criticism in dissenting from a decision banning prayer at public school
graduation ceremonies: "Today's opinion shows more forcefully than volumes of argumentation why our Nation's protection, that fortress which is
our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon the changeable philosophical
predilections of the Justices of this Court, but must have deep foundations in
'
the historic practices of our people."24
In regard to a practice sanctioned by the revealed Word of God, as was
the death penalty under the Talmud, the situation of the rabbis was far more
constricted than is that of the American judge. Haim Cohn, Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel, describes that restriction as follows:
Like all theocratic law, the laws prescribing punishments and
allocating them to various offenses are emanations of God's will,
and their primary purpose is expiation, to turn away God's blazing
anger. Not only are criminals and their crimes an abomination in
the eyes of God and must for this reason alone be eliminated, but
the very character of punishment as God's command leaves no
alternative.25
Nevertheless, Justice Cohn describes a number of ways in which the

23.
24.
25.

ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975).
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649. 2679 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
Haim Cohn, The Penology of the Talmud, I ISRAEL L. REV. 53 (1970).
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rabbis did modify penal practice, from changing the modes of execution
(while keeping the names the same as in the Bible) to the elimination of
most talionic punishments. These reforms were accomplished by a complex
reinterpretation of God's word, in light of deeply held rabbinic ideals ideals, it was felt, that God would surely share.26 Such radical reform took
place outside the penal context as well.27 As we shall see below, the confidence the rabbis had in God rendered reform more easily attainable than
reform is in our positivist age, which skeptically views any talk of ideals and
morality. That is, it was easier for the rabbis to depart from the Word of God
than it is for American judges today to depart from the voice of the people.
But, however easily reform could be accomplished, neither the American
Judge nor the Talmudic Rabbi felt himself free simply to abolish the death
penalty as an exercise of personal moral insight.
V. TALMUDIC VOICES ADDRESSING THE DEATH PENALTY

The Talmud does not explain why the law is as it is. One would look in
vain for an explanation of why this rabbi or that rabbi favored or opposed
the death penalty. In fact, it is not accurate to speak of opposition to the
death penalty in the American sense. All of the rabbis were bound to some
notion of the death penalty because the Bible - the Word of God - approved of it and demanded it. Nor does it make sense to speak of support for
the death penalty in the American sense. No rabbi looked with anything but
horror upon both violent crime and violent punishment.
Within those limits, however, there is among the rabbis more or less
commitment to the death penalty. And there are snatches of comments that
help to put these commitments in perspective.
A. Deterrence
The most famous exchange in the Talmud on the subject of the death
penalty occurs in Makkoth:
A Sanhedrin that effects an execution once in seven years, is
branded a destructive tribunal; R. Eliezer B. Azariah says: once in
seventy years. R. Tarfon and R. Akiba say: Were we members of
a Sanhedrin, no person would ever be put to death. [Thereupon]
Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel remarked, [yea] and they would also
multiply shedders of blood in Israel!28

26. Id.
27. See Israel J. Kazis, Judaism and the Death Penalty, in CONTEMPORARY JEWISH ETHICS 326
(Menachem Marc Kellner ed., 1978) (discussing the elimination of cancellation of debts by Hillel).
28. MISHNEH, Makkoth, ch. 1, § 10.
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The terseness of this exchange should not obscure its significance. The
Talmud selects carefully. This exchange demonstrates the well-known rabbinic reluctance to execute in the formal death penalty system. All four rabbis
mentioned in the story appear to accept the one-in-seven-year frequency of
the death penalty as an appropriate interval. R. Simeon B. Gamaliel does not
appear to wish to speed up the existing system, nor to bring more wrongdoers to justice. And there were wrongdoers who avoided execution. The tone
of the first part of the exchange suggests that there were other guilty parties
apprehended during the seven years, but that for various reasons they were
not executed.
R. Tarfon and R. Akiba reflect the most extreme rabbinic reluctance to
execute. The Gemara explains how they would preclude the death penalty
without denying its divine legitimacy. The rabbis would ask improbable and
obscure questions of the witnesses - such as whether it were not possible
that the victim had been suffering from some fatal disease, which actually
killed him. A lack of certainty by the witnesses on any material point would
bar formal execution.
R. Tarfon and R. Akiba are outside the rabbinic mainstream. The Gemara
states that the "Rabbis," here apparently the mainstream rabbis not opposed
to capital punishment, would not ask such searching questions, thus permitting the formal death penalty to be imposed more easily. This is an illustration of the disagreement among the rabbis in regard to the death penalty that
Gerald Blidstein has noted was never resolved.
What can be said about the reasons R. Tarfon and R. Akiba opposed the
death penalty? Nothing can be said with confidence. From the fragment
above we know only that they were opposed to the death penalty for anyone.
Elsewhere, R. Akiba is quoted as teaching, "Whoever spills blood destroys
the image [of God]."" Presumably, this idea represents the foundation of R.
Akiba's opposition to the death penalty.
If the reasons for rabbinic opposition are unclear, the source of support
for the death penalty in this fragment is unambiguous - deterrence. For R.
Gamaliel, the absence of the death penalty would lead to an increase in violent crime. There was a widespread Talmudic concern about the threat of
breakdown in the social order. For example, when one left a city, one was to
pray that he not be attacked on the way." The existence of alternative systems of execution may possibly be explained by such fear.
Nevertheless, even given such fear, R. Gamaliel's view is difficult to
understand. He does not dispute that the Sanhedrin should refrain from executing more than once every seven years. What kind of deterrence would be
possible in such a setting? Of course a Talmudic exchange should not be

29.

TOSEFrA YEBUMOTH 8:4.

30.

BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Berakoth 60a.
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looked at as a conversation. R. Gamaliel was not necessarily responding to
the first part of the paragraph; he may have been discussing the idea of abolition of the death penalty.
By arranging this exchange in its current form, the Talmudic redactor has
suggested the following: that a broad rabbinic consensus existed favoring an
infrequently invoked formal death penalty; that the same consensus preferred
to overlook the informal capital practices probably in use at the same time;
that a substantial rabbinic view held that the use of the formal death penalty
should be reduced even further; and that two minority viewpoints confronted
each other - one that would have abolished the death penalty altogether and
another that would have strengthened it in the name of deterrence.
This Talmudic exchange has parallels to the America experience with
death penalty debate. Americans against the death penalty generally would
oppose the death penalty even if it were established as an effective deterrent
of violent crime. So, too, presumably do R. Tarfon and R. Akiba.
The American proponent of the death penalty, however, argues today
from a broader perspective than did R. Gamaliel. The American proponent
does, of course, criticize abolitionists for undermining deterrence, as did R.
Gamaliel. But, American death penalty proponents often also insist that the
death penalty is a just and, in some contexts, the only just sanction.
R. Gamaliel's sole reliance on deterrence may stem from two sources.
First, the rabbis were very concerned about deterrence and societal breakdown. They seem to have had more confidence in the unique effectiveness
of, and need for, the death penalty than we have today. This is not too surprising since ancient Israel lacked large scale reliable institutions of incarceration.
Illustrative of the rabbinic fear of social breakdown, two stories are told
in the Talmud about punishments imposed that were not legally justified. In
the first, a man was stoned to death for riding on the Sabbath because at that
time adherence to rabbinic religious pronouncements was weak.3 In the
second, a husband was flogged for having sexual relations with his wife in
public "because the times required [the flogging]."32
There is, however, a more fundamental reason for R. Gamaliel's sole
reliance on deterrence. A call for justice in favor of the death penalty would
have conflicted with deeply held rabbinic attitudes toward the relationship of
justice and mercy.

31.
32.

Attributed to Rashi in the SONCINO TALMUD 303 n.8 (1935).
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 46a.
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B. Justice and Mercy
The American death penalty debate is beset by the justice issue. American opponents of the death penalty do not, by and large, agree that murderers
- or other wrongdoers - deserve to die. Nor is there a consensus in America about the standards of morality that would allow the death penalty question to be resolved. Proponents of the death penalty may have convinced a
majority of voters that murderers deserve to die, but they cannot demonstrate
this proposition by reasoning from generally accepted premises. The rabbis
did not have this problem. The proper punishments for crime were set forth
in God's Word. Even the abolitionist rabbis could hardly claim that the death
penalty was conceptually illegitimate.
The death penalty debate in the Talmud, therefore, can be viewed as not
so much about justice, as about mercy. Gerald Blidstein suggests that the
death penalty debate in classic Jewish thought manifested contrasting Jewish
understandings of the nature of mercy. One point of view equated justice and
mercy, whereas the other point of view found in mercy the dynamic divinb
quality that controls and limits the demand for justice.33 Several classical
Jewish sources regard the Biblical command to deliver the murderer to execution - "Thine eye shall not pity him"' - as a warning against any reluctance to execute.35
But this view - the harsh demand of the law for punishment - contrasts with a general rabbinic reluctance to invoke justice in punishment. This
reluctance is illustrated in the following Talmudic story.
In the neighborhood of R. Joshua b. Levi there was a Sadducee who used to annoy him very much with [his interpretations of]
texts. One day the Rabbi took a cock, placed it between the legs
of his bed and watched it. He thought: When this moment arrives
I shall curse him. When the moment arrived he was dozing. [On
waking up] he said: We learn from this that it is not proper to act
in such a way. It is written: And His tender mercies are over all
His works. And it is further written: Neither is it good for the
righteous to punish.36
In the classic Jewish tradition, mercy occupies a central role. This helps
explain why a proponent of the death penalty would argue from deterrence
for only in deterrence is harsh punishment merciful, merciful at least to
potential innocent victims. Such a position could support the death penalty

33.
34.
35.
36.

Blidstein, supra note 7, at 318-21.
Deuteronomy 19:13.
Blidstein, supra note 7. at 318-19.
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Berakoth 7a.
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without denying the centrality of mercy. And, insofar as the tradition's existing limitations on the death penalty manifested mercy, R. Gamaliel does not
criticize them.
A love of mercy and a dread of strict justice are common Talmudic
themes. In the same discussion in which the story of R. Joshua b. Levi appears, the Talmud tells a beautiful tale about the prayer of God. The prayer
God prays is that his mercy may overcome His anger.
R. Johanan says in the name of R. Jose: How do we know
that the Holy One, blessed be He, says prayers? Because it says:
Even them will I bring to My holy mountain and make them joyful
in My house of prayer. It is not said, "their prayer," but "My
prayer"; hence [you learn] that the Holy One, blessed be He, says
prayers. What does he pray? - R. Zutra b. Tobi said in the name
of Rab: "May it be My will that My mercy may suppress My
anger, and that My mercy may prevail over My [other] attributes,
so that I may deal with My children in the attribute of mercy and,
on their behalf, stop short of the limit of strict justice." It was
taught: R. Ishmael b. Elisha says: I once entered into the innermost part [of the Sanctuary] to offer incense and saw Akathriel
Jah, the Lord of Hosts, seated upon a high and exalted throne. He
said to me: Ishmael, My son, bless Me! I replied: May it be Thy
will that Thy mercy may suppress Thy anger and Thy mercy may
prevail over Thy other attributes, so that Thou mayest deal with
Thy children according to the attribute of mercy and mayest, on
their behalf, stop short of the limit of strict justice! And He nodded to me with his head.37
Here the tradition displays its two minds. The anger of God is just and
deserved. The wrongdoer should be punished harshly. But mercy is the highest attribute. It is invoked as even a "blessing" to God. R. Joshua links the
mercy God would bestow on man to the mercy that the righteous should
bestow on wrongdoers.
The Talmud also tells of God's suffering at the death of the wicked. The
Mishnah teaches that the hanged body must be buried before nightfall, for he
that is hanged is a reproach to God. In interpreting the phrase, "reproach to
God," the Mishnah attributes to R. Meir the following description of God's
suffering when even the wicked are punished:
R. Meir said, When a man undergoes suffering.38 What does the
Shechinah say (as it were)? "My head is in pain, My arm is

37.
38.

Id.
"Because of his sins" is added here in THE MISHNAH, supra note 13, at 265.
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heavy." If this be so, and the Omnipresent is troubled because of
the blood of the wicked that is shed, how much more [is He sorely troubled] at the blood of the righteous."
The Soncino edition of the Talmud' comments concerning the phrase
"The Name of Heaven is profaned," which refers to the effect of a publicly
displayed hanged body: "Man's sin reflecting, in a manner of speaking, on
God."4
The Gemara attributes to R. Meir a parable illustrating how the hanged
man's death reflects on God:
R. Meir said: A parable was stated; To what is this matter comparable? To two twin brothers [who lived] in one city; one was
appointed king, and the other took to highway robbery. At the
king's command they hanged him. But all who saw him exclaimed, "The king is hanged!" Whereupon the king issued a
command and he was taken down.4"
Now, any tradition that teaches that Ted Bundy is God's twin brother
takes very seriously the description of man as created in the "image of God."
And, obviously, such a tradition would be deeply troubled by any execution.
On the other hand, the Rabbis of the Talmud were also moved powerfully by
the death of the crime victim. This is perhaps why murder is usually the
example of a capital crime discussed in the Talmud though there are many
other such crimes. And this is perhaps why the death penalty always remained the norm, even when it was rarely invoked.
C. Repentance and Atonement
There is a justification for mercy that goes beyond a dread of punishment. Mercy gives space for repentance by the wrongdoer. The ultimate goal
of the Talmudic criminal justice system was not justice, but repentance. This
can be seen in a story parallel to that of R. Levi,43 but with the emphasis on
repentance rather than on mercy:
Certain criminals lived in the vicinity of R. Meir and they
subjected him to much harassment, and he prayed that they might
die. His wife Beruria said to him: How do you justify such a

39. MISHNEH, Sanhedrin. ch. 6, § 5.
40. THE BABLONIAN TALMUD (Rabbi Dr. Isidore Epstein ed., 1953).
41. Id. at 304 n.8.
42. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 46b.
43. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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prayer? Is it because it is written: "Let sinners cease from the
earth" (Ps. 104:35)? But the word as written means literally "sin,"
not "sinners." Moreover, consider the last part of the verse: "and
let the wicked be no more." When sins will cease, the wicked will
be no more. You should rather pray that they repent, and then the
wicked will be no more. He prayed that they repent, and they
repented."
Now doubtless in part the point of this story is the effect of such prayer
on R. Meir. In this the story is like that of R. Levi: the righteous should not
punish.
But Beruria's comment goes further than that. She knows, where R. Meir
has forgotten, that the purpose of law is repentance rather than proper and
just judgment. The Jewish moral order is repaired not by punishment of the
wrongdoer but by his repentance. Why did such a tradition not abolish the
death penalty? The answer is, of course, that to an extent it did. And to an
extent, given the Word of God, it felt it could not.
The continuation of the death penalty may also be explained by the problem of atonement. The Talmud clearly explained that God could forgive
offenses against himself but could not forgive offenses against other persons.
"Transgressions between man and God may be atoned on the Day of Atonement, but transgressions between man and man will not be atoned on the
Day of Atonement until one has appeased his fellowman."4 5
Although there were many capital crimes, it is no accident that murder
dominates in Talmudic discussion of the death penalty. In murder, appeasement is not possible. It is noteworthy in this regard that R. Levi and R. Meir
are the victims of crime who pray for the criminal's repentance. It may even
be that the atonement brought about by the execution takes the place of
appeasement of the murder victim in accomplishing acceptance of repentance. The Mishnah contains a full and obviously important treatment of
atonement, including the following explanation of the need for confession at
an execution: "Everyone that confesses has a portion in the world to
come."' If the wrongdoer did not know how to make confession, he was
instructed.
The need for atonement where repentance was not sufficient may be why
the early tradition - The Bible47 - insisted that of all punishment, the
punishment of the murderer in particular must be carried out. The change in
the tradition to a stance of some opposition to the death penalty may have re-
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flected a new and difficult insight - that even in murder, even without forgiveness by the victim, mercy and acceptance of repentance are possible
without application of strict justice.
D. Innocence
Unlike the American death penalty debate, there is no indication that the
chance of wrongly executing an innocent person affected Talmudic death
penalty debate. All of the rabbis seem to have regarded such wrongful execution as totally unacceptable. The fanatic procedural and evidentiary hurdles
employed in the Talmud's formal death penalty system can be understood as
in part stemming from an abhorrence of convicting and executing - or even
punishing in other ways - the innocent. The proof requirements assured that
the accused was in fact the perpetrator. The required warning assured that the
accused acted intentionally. Thus, although it is commonly and accurately
said that these requirements prevented the execution of almost anyone, these
requirements primarily prevented the execution of anyone who was innocent.
The rabbinic determination to protect the innocent no doubt furthered the
universal acceptance of these strict requirements.
The rabbinic determination to avoid punishment of the innocent could
lead to extreme results, as the evidentiary rejection of circumstantial evidence
and confessions illustrates. The Gemara describes the rejection of circumstantial evidence in the following well-known passage: "[The judge] says to
them: Perhaps you saw him running after his fellow into a ruin, you pursued
him, and found him sword in hand with blood dripping from it, while the
murdered man was writhing [in agony]: If this is what you saw, you saw
nothing."48
But despite all the precautions, and the rigid proof requirements, conviction or acquittal in a Talmudic capital case still depended on potentially
fallible or even corrupt witnesses. The rabbis recognized that there could be
no guaranty against the execution of an innocent person. The consciousness
of this potentiality is demonstrated in a revealing Mishnah. The prescribed
confessional prayer was "let my death be an atonement for my sins." After
explaining how the condemned person was to be helped to confess his sin,
the Mishnah adds: "R. Judah says, If he knew that he had been sentenced
through false evidence he says 'let my death be an atonement for all my sins
save this sin'. 49
This suggestion by R. Judah shows that despite the precautions, there
were some accused who made a sufficiently plausible claim of innocence that
a minority of rabbis felt a ritual amendment was needed. Even more to the
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point, the tradition rejected R. Judah's amended confession on the ground
that "everyone would speak in this fashion to show his innocence."5 In the
Philip Blackman edition of the Mishnah, the editor's comment to this passage points to the rabbinical fear that "judges and witnesses would be discredited and justice held in contempt" if the condemned went to their deaths
officially proclaiming their innocence.' Some of the rabbis apparently did
not believe the evidentiary and other requirements for conviction fully
eliminated the possibility of executing the innocent.
In the American death penalty debate, innocence has played a different,
indeed partisan, role. American opponents of the death penalty have attempted to show that the death penalty has and will lead to the executions of innocent persons. 2 The response from proponents of the death penalty has taken
two different paths. On one hand, proponents argue that because of already
existing procedural and evidentiary requirements, innocent persons are unlikely to receive the death penalty. This is the sort of response R. Gamaliel
would have made, although, unlike a rabbinic court, the American criminal
courts do not always have jurisdiction to handle claims of innocence after the
trial is over. 3
But the other response - what might be called the road response - is
more demonstrative of the difference between Talmudic and American consciousness. American proponents of the death penalty often acknowledge the
inevitability of error. They defend even the possibility of substantial numbers
of erroneous executions. When we build a road, we know that a certain number of workers will die. Yet we continue to build roads. Thus it is with the
death penalty.' In this response, more than in any other discussion, we can
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Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987).
53. Some would say that such a lack of jurisdiction killed Roger Coleman. Cf. Coleman v. Thompson,
dissenting) (denial of stay of execution). The United States Su112 S. Ct. 1845 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
preme Court has recently held that, at least absent extraordinary circumstances, innocence is not an independent ground for relief under federal habeas corpus, even in a death penalty case. Herrera v. Collins,
113 S.Ct. 2325 (1993).
54. Lest the reader think we exaggerate:
In capital cases, miscarriages of justice are more grave than in other cases. Nonetheless,
some will occur, however much we try to avoid them, since courts are fallible. Innocents
are killed in most human activities, not just in war. Truck traffic kills innocent pedestrians
every year. Construction debris may kill innocent passersby; so may policing. We don't
give up these activities because the advantages statistically outweigh foreseeable accidents.
Miscarriages of justice are just as unintended, accidental and foreseeable. Here too the
advantages-the morality and deterrent usefulness of the death penalty-outweigh the disadvantages. Execution would be disadvantageous only if miscarriages were so frequent as
to cause the risk innocents run to be executed to rival that of murderers. Not even the most
fanatic abolitionist contends that this is the case.
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see the rabbis' moral seriousness and compare it with our morally frivolous

culture.
VI. AMERICAN AND JEWISH EXPERIENCE WITH THE
ANTI-CRUELTY PRINCIPLE: THE SIXTH COMMANDMENT
VERSUS THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
One of the striking failures of the American legal community has been
an inability to formulate and implement a coherent vision of the anti-cruelty
principle. In contrast, classic Jewish law had a fairly stable sense of which
sorts of punishment would be permitted and which would not be permitted.
Francine Klagsburn has noted that it was the value of human life that
originally led to the biblical code providing for capital punishment.55 The
alternatives to the death penalty at the time - monetary compensation or
substituted punishment - had the effect of exalting certain wrongdoers over
others or devaluing certain victims compared to other victims. The biblical
insistence on execution focused on the precious life the murderer had taken:
"Your eye shall not pity him, but you shall purge the guilt of innocent blood
from Israel, so that it may be well with you."56
The Talmud condemns all murder equally. Life history does not matter;,
neither do the circumstances of the crime; nor the survivors left behind. But
if all life is precious, so that it does not really matter who killed or who was
killed, then does not the same principle of the preciousness of life lead to
abhorrence of the death penalty as well? This is the point made by Gerald
Blidstein when he traces the root of the Hebrew word in the Sixth Commandment - r-z-ch - to the same root used to describe permitted killings
in the Bible and judicially imposed executions in the Talmud.57 Thus, according to Blidstein, the Sixth Commandment has been inaccurately translated as "You shall not murder" when the sense of the Hebrew phrase is "you
shall not kill." Such a translation does not invalidate Biblical law, which
demands execution in numerous contexts. But it does express the reluctance
to execute that Blidstein considers a characteristic of Talmudic thought. As
Moshe Sokol has put it, various sources in the Jewish tradition suggest that
there is "some dimension of wrong" in even morally justified killing.5"
There are a number of other sources also associated with rabbinic discomfort with the death penalty. Justice Haim Cohn identifies the Talmudic
reform that led to changes in the methods of execution with the injunction
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"love your neighbor as yourself,"59 which was interpreted to mean "devise
an easy death for him."' J.H. Hertz suggests that Deut. 25: 3, which limits
flogging to forty blows lest "your brother should be dishonored before your
eyes," identifies a general notion that "punishment must have a decidedly
moral aim; viz. the improvement of the criminal." 6 ' And, of course, R.
Meir's story appealing to the likeness of God in every man would also cause
one to pause about the death penalty.62
These ideas do not state a single principle, but they do bear resemblances. And in all of them, every human life is uniquely important. From this
bedrock, the rabbis set out to reform a number of aspects of the capital punishment system. The psychological assurance necessary to such action was
"their belief in a merciful God who would surely approve of their abhorrence
'
of cruel and inhuman punishments."63
But if we contrast rabbinic faith that reality favors mercy with modernity,
we find skepticism and weariness instead of faith. American judicial decisions implementing fundamental rights are criticized today by many legal
thinkers as an illegitimate substitution of rule by judge for rule by law or by
majority. What makes such decisions illegitimate in this argument is that
there is no unchanging moral foundation establishing fundamental rights;
there is only "one's own moral view:"
[N]o argument that is both coherent and respectable can be made
supporting a Supreme Court that "chooses fundamental values"
because a Court that makes rather than implements value choices
cannot be squared with the presuppositions of a democratic society. The man who understands the issues and nevertheless insists
upon the rightness of the Warren Court's performance ought also,
if he is candid, to admit that he is prepared to sacrifice democratic
process to his own moral views. He claims for the Supreme Court
an institutionalized role as perpetrator of limited coups d'etat.M
This attack is traditionally made on so-called non-interpretivism, whereby
the courts protect rights not present, in some sense, in the text of the Constitution. Conceivably, decisions implementing the anti-cruelty provision in the
Eighth Amendment would not be subject to the same criticism. That text
provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,

59.
60.

Leviticus 19:18.
Cohn, supra note 22, at 58.

61.

JOSEPH HERMAN HERTZ, THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS 854 (1938).

62.
63.
64.

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
Cohn, supra note 25, at 72.
Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1971).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

(Vol. 6

65
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.,
One would imagine that the task of a society bound by this anti-cruelty
principle would be to understand its application to everyday life. That is, one
would ask what makes a particular punishment "cruel and unusual." In this
way a culture would through time and precedent develop an understanding of
what cruelty is and why it is forbidden.
This is what the rabbis of the Talmud did, in effect, with the Sixth Commandment and other norms expressive of the value of human life. They let
those norms speak in a critique of existing practices. Thus did they effect
reform.
But despite a clear text, many legal thinkers today do not want to reason
about the meaning of human cruelty or any other norm. Instead, in parallel to
the critique of non-interpretivism, they wish to subject the Eighth Amendment to some sort of "objective" analysis. Raoul Berger, for example, appeals to the original intention of the framers in interpreting the Eighth
Amendment.' From the skeptical perspective, a court that interprets even
specific language beyond clear history or demonstrable community values
also is making rather than implementing value choices.
This jurisprudence of skepticism now dominates judicial decisions. The
United States Supreme Court, even the more liberal Justices, appeal to objective indicia of a developing national consensus in interpreting the Eighth
Amendment. In Thompson v. Oklahoma,67 Justice Stevens reasoned from
such objective criteria in concluding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the execution of a 15-year-old: "[I]ndicators of contemporary standards of
decency, [legislation, jury verdicts and so forth] [indicate that] the imposition
of the death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is now generally abhorrent to
the conscience of the community."6 And if tomorrow that consensus should
change, presumably 15-year-olds could again be executed.
What occurs in argument of this sort reflects, as Hadley Arkes has noted,
the American legal tradition's current belief that reasoning about morality is
impossible.69 According to this skeptical view, we can never get to the truth
of an issue such as whether the death penalty is cruel or not. All we are left
with are our own opinions on the matter.

VII. CONCLUSION: THE MEANING OF AN EXECUTION
Professor Aaron Schreiber writes of the Talmudic criminal trial: "It may
be that criminal trials in Jewish law were in essence a mode of divine ser-
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vice, or ritual, whose function was to attain atonement for the convict, and
not necessarily to fathom the truth."70
Professor Schreiber captures here a core of Talmudic thought - man's
need for atonement through ritual acts. The death penalty is a part of, and
not separate from, this general attitude. An execution, though awesome, is
not an act of hostility. It is a ritual opportunity for the condemned prisoner to
attain atonement.
In contrast with the Talmud, what do we in America today believe we
are doing when we execute a murderer? Not many Americans believe that
the criminal is atoning for his crime through a ritual act. In execution, we
may be deterring crime, satisfying the victim's family, saving money or even
getting rid of the garbage. Not one of these is atonement. Each of these
purposes is something done to the criminal, not for him and not with him.
By doing to the criminal and not for him, we in America have severed the
link of humanity with the criminal, a motivation that never occurred to the
rabbis.
It might be said that the execution restores the moral balance destroyed
by the murder and thus is an act of just retribution. And the most profound
death penalty proponent would say that every member of society is a participant in the collective quest for justice - even the criminal about to be executed.
This attitude, if we felt it truly, could transform the American death
penalty from today's bored bureaucratic function alternating with occasional
sensational media event, to the highest shared ritual of which a secular society is capable. But then, we would have to take seriously what we do. Our
process, to be worthy, would have to be thought about as seriously as was
death penalty law in the Talmud.
Compare our trials with the Sanhedrin that left the Temple rounds when
the rising murder rate rendered it impossible for the trials to be dealt with
"properly."'" Since the criminal trial was a ritual, for the glory of Heaven
the trial had to be done properly and with proper intention. A ritual cannot
be bureaucratized and remain a ritual.
We today would not give up the death penalty in the face of a rising
murder rate. We would move to summary procedures, more courts, a weakening of procedural and evidentiary restrictions, a cutback in habeas corpus
jurisdiction. In short, we would do what we have done.
The greatest horror in an American execution is that the taking of human
life is done frivolously. The horror is that we feel no horror for what we do.
In that absence we see the clearest contrast between American and Talmudic
life.
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